Bayesian Auction Design and Approximation

We study two classes of problems within Algorithmic Economics: revenue guarantees of simple mechanisms, and social welfare guarantees of auctions. We develop new structural and algorithmic tools for addressing these problems, and obtain the following results: In the -unit model, four canonical mechanisms can be classified as: (i) the discriminating group, including Myerson Auction and Sequential Posted-Pricing, and (ii) the anonymous group, including Anonymous Reserve and Anonymous Pricing. We prove that any two mechanisms from the same group have an asymptotically tight revenue gap of 1 + θ(1 /√), while any two mechanisms from the different groups have an asymptotically tight revenue gap of θ(log ). In the single-item model, we prove a nearly-tight sample complexity of Anonymous Reserve for every value distribution family investigated in the literature: [0, 1]-bounded, [1, ]-bounded, regular, and monotone hazard rate (MHR). Remarkably, the setting-specific sample complexity poly(⁻¹) depends on the precision ∈ (0, 1), but not on the number of bidders ≥ 1. Further, in the two bounded-support settings, our algorithm allows correlated value distributions. These are in sharp contrast to the previous (nearly-tight) sample complexity results on Myerson Auction. In the single-item model, we prove that the tight Price of Anarchy/Stability for First Price Auctions are both PoA = PoS = 1 - 1/² ≈ 0.8647

Learning Reserve Prices in Second-Price Auctions

This paper proves the tight sample complexity of Second-Price Auction with Anonymous Reserve, up to a logarithmic factor, for each of all the value distribution families studied in the literature: [0,1]-bounded, [1,H]-bounded, regular, and monotone hazard rate (MHR). Remarkably, the setting-specific tight sample complexity poly(?^{-1}) depends on the precision ? ? (0, 1), but not on the number of bidders n ? 1. Further, in the two bounded-support settings, our learning algorithm allows correlated value distributions. In contrast, the tight sample complexity ??(n) ? poly(?^{-1}) of Myerson Auction proved by Guo, Huang and Zhang (STOC 2019) has a nearly-linear dependence on n ? 1, and holds only for independent value distributions in every setting. We follow a similar framework as the Guo-Huang-Zhang work, but replace their information theoretical arguments with a direct proof

Learning Reserve Prices in Second-Price Auctions

This paper proves the tight sample complexity of Second-Price Auction with Anonymous Reserve, up to a logarithmic factor, for all value distribution families that have been considered in the literature. Compared to Myerson Auction, whose sample complexity was settled very recently in (Guo, Huang and Zhang, STOC 2019), Anonymous Reserve requires much fewer samples for learning. We follow a similar framework as the Guo-Huang-Zhang work, but replace their information theoretical argument with a direct proof

Tight Revenue Gaps among Multi-Unit Mechanisms

This paper considers Bayesian revenue maximization in the $k$-unit setting, where a monopolist seller has $k$ copies of an indivisible item and faces $n$ unit-demand buyers (whose value distributions can be non-identical). Four basic mechanisms among others have been widely employed in practice and widely studied in the literature: {\sf Myerson Auction}, {\sf Sequential Posted-Pricing}, {\sf $(k + 1)$-th Price Auction with Anonymous Reserve}, and {\sf Anonymous Pricing}. Regarding a pair of mechanisms, we investigate the largest possible ratio between the two revenues (a.k.a.\ the revenue gap), over all possible value distributions of the buyers. Divide these four mechanisms into two groups: (i)~the discriminating mechanism group, {\sf Myerson Auction} and {\sf Sequential Posted-Pricing}, and (ii)~the anonymous mechanism group, {\sf Anonymous Reserve} and {\sf Anonymous Pricing}. Within one group, the involved two mechanisms have an asymptotically tight revenue gap of $1 + \Theta(1 / \sqrt{k})$. In contrast, any two mechanisms from the different groups have an asymptotically tight revenue gap of $\Theta(\log k)$

Subset Sum in Time 2^{n/2} / poly(n)

A major goal in the area of exact exponential algorithms is to give an algorithm for the (worst-case) n-input Subset Sum problem that runs in time 2^{(1/2 - c)n} for some constant c > 0. In this paper we give a Subset Sum algorithm with worst-case running time O(2^{n/2} ? n^{-?}) for a constant ? > 0.5023 in standard word RAM or circuit RAM models. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first improvement on the classical "meet-in-the-middle" algorithm for worst-case Subset Sum, due to Horowitz and Sahni, which can be implemented in time O(2^{n/2}) in these memory models [Horowitz and Sahni, 1974]. Our algorithm combines a number of different techniques, including the "representation method" introduced by Howgrave-Graham and Joux [Howgrave-Graham and Joux, 2010] and subsequent adaptations of the method in Austrin, Kaski, Koivisto, and Nederlof [Austrin et al., 2016], and Nederlof and W?grzycki [Jesper Nederlof and Karol Wegrzycki, 2021], and "bit-packing" techniques used in the work of Baran, Demaine, and P?tra?cu [Baran et al., 2005] on subquadratic algorithms for 3SUM

Fourier Growth of Structured ??-Polynomials and Applications

We analyze the Fourier growth, i.e. the L? Fourier weight at level k (denoted L_{1,k}), of various well-studied classes of "structured" m F?-polynomials. This study is motivated by applications in pseudorandomness, in particular recent results and conjectures due to [Chattopadhyay et al., 2019; Chattopadhyay et al., 2019; Eshan Chattopadhyay et al., 2020] which show that upper bounds on Fourier growth (even at level k = 2) give unconditional pseudorandom generators. Our main structural results on Fourier growth are as follows: - We show that any symmetric degree-d m F?-polynomial p has L_{1,k}(p) ? Pr [p = 1] ? O(d)^k. This quadratically strengthens an earlier bound that was implicit in [Omer Reingold et al., 2013]. - We show that any read-? degree-d m F?-polynomial p has L_{1,k}(p) ? Pr [p = 1] ? (k ? d)^{O(k)}. - We establish a composition theorem which gives L_{1,k} bounds on disjoint compositions of functions that are closed under restrictions and admit L_{1,k} bounds. Finally, we apply the above structural results to obtain new unconditional pseudorandom generators and new correlation bounds for various classes of m F?-polynomials